Comment on "AndrODet: An adaptive Android obfuscation detector" by Mohammadinodooshan, Alireza et al.
Comment on “AndrODet: An adaptive Android obfuscation detector”
Alireza Mohammadinodooshan, Ulf Karge´n, Nahid Shahmehri
Department of Computer and Information Science, Linko¨ping University, SE-58183 Linko¨ping, Sweden
Abstract
We have identified a methodological problem in the empirical evaluation of the string encryption detection
capabilities of the AndrODet system described by Mirzaei et al. in the recent paper AndrODet: An adaptive
Android obfuscation detector. The accuracy of string encryption detection is evaluated using samples from
the AMD and PraGuard malware datasets. However, the authors failed to account for the fact that many
of the samples are highly similar due to the fact that they come from the same malware family. This
introduces a risk that a machine learning system trained on these samples could fail to learn a generalizable
model for string encryption detection, and might instead learn to classify samples based on characteristics of
each malware family. Our own evaluation strongly indicates that the reported high accuracy of AndrODets
string encryption detection is indeed due to this phenomenon. When we evaluated AndrODet, we found
that when we ensured that samples from the same family never appeared in both training and testing data,
the accuracy dropped to around 50%. Moreover, the PraGuard dataset is not suitable for evaluating a
static string encryption detector such as AndrODet, since the obfuscation tool used to produce the dataset
effectively makes it impossible to extract meaningful features of static strings in Android apps.
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1. Introduction
In their paper AndrODet: An adaptive Android
obfuscation detector [1], Mirzaei at al. present
the modular machine learning system AndrODet,
which is capable of detecting three types of obfusca-
tion in Android apps using statically extracted fea-
tures: string encryption, identifier renaming, and
control-flow obfuscation. AndrODet uses the MOA
[2] framework to perform on-line learning. The
authors also compare their on-line approach with
batch learning. In this comment paper, we have
only considered the string encryption (SE) detec-
tion capabilities of AndrODet. Therefore, we re-
strict the discussion to SE detection for the remain-
der of the paper.
The authors propose several features for classi-
fying apps as string encrypted, such as the aver-
age string entropy, average string length, etc., and
Email addresses:
alireza.mohammadinodooshan@liu.se (Alireza
Mohammadinodooshan), ulf.kargen@liu.se (Ulf Karge´n),
nahid.shahmehri@liu.se (Nahid Shahmehri)
evaluate on-line and batch models based on these
features. For on-line learning, a combination of the
AMD [3] and PraGuard [4] datasets are used for
training and evaluation, whereas for batch-learning
the model was trained on the AMD dataset and
evaluated on the PraGuard dataset. The AMD
set consists of 24,533 malware samples labeled with
the obfuscation methods used by each sample (if
any). PraGuard was constructed by collecting sam-
ples from two malware databases and running them
through the DexGuard [5] obfuscation tool.
The evaluation by Mirzaei et al. shows that,
using the features proposed in the paper, both
batch learning and on-line learning approaches can
achieve over 80% accuracy in SE detection. How-
ever, upon closer examination, we discovered a sig-
nificant methodological problem in the way their
evaluation is performed. While the AMD dataset
has almost 25,000 malware samples, the samples in
the dataset all belong to one of 71 malware fami-
lies. Therefore, many samples share unique charac-
teristics due to the fact that they belong to the
same family. Moreover, for most malware fami-
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lies, all samples are in the same class, i.e., either
all samples use SE or none of the samples use SE.
(Only 3,883 samples belong to a family that has
both SE and non-SE members.) This introduces a
risk of memorization, i.e., that the classifier learns
a set of unique signatures of malware families, in-
stead of a generalizable model to detect SE. Since
Mirzaei et al. make no effort to split the dataset
during evaluation of their approach, so that mal-
ware of the same family never appears in both train-
ing and testing data, such memorization would also
risk artificially inflating the measured accuracy of
the model. Our own evaluation strongly suggests
that the reported high accuracy is indeed due to
memorization. We trained and evaluated models
on the AMD dataset with the same configuration
and feature set as Mirzaei et al., using both batch
learning and on-line learning. In the first experi-
ment, a training and testing subset was created by
randomly sampling apps from the AMD dataset.
In the second experiment, we instead made sure
that the dataset was split so that samples from the
same family never appeared in both the training
and testing subsets. In the first experiment, we
achieved an average accuracy of 92% and 80% for
the batch and on-line cases respectively (using 100-
fold cross validation), which is similar to the ac-
curacy reported by Mirzaei et al. However, in the
second experiment, wherein we eliminated the pos-
sibility of learning a model based on the malware
family, the respective accuracies dropped to 50%
and 53%.
The dramatic drop in accuracy was surprising
to us at first, as the accuracy when evaluating the
batch learning model on the PraGuard dataset was
very high according to the paper, which in turn
seems to imply that the model can generalize well
across different datasets. Unfortunately, however,
the good performance on the PraGuard dataset ap-
pears to be coincidental. Since the DexGuard tool
that was used to generate the PraGuard dataset
employs a SE method that is fundamentally dif-
ferent from what is used by most other obfusca-
tors, this dataset is not well-suited to evaluate how
well an SE detector generalizes. Furthermore, the
PraGuard dataset is particularly ill-suited to eval-
uate the AndrODet system, since the DexGuard
tool effectively makes it impossible to statically
extract the features used by AndrODet from en-
crypted strings. We further elaborate on this issue
in Section 4.
2. Background
In this section, we first provide some technical
background on Android apps, which is required
to understand the following discussion. We then
briefly describe the AndrODet system.
Android apps are distributed in the form of An-
droid application packages (APKs), which can in
turn contain several DEX-files. Each DEX file
contains static data and bytecode of one or more
classes. Of particular interest to our discussion here
is the string section of a DEX file, where all iden-
tifiers (method names, etc.) and constant strings
used by the contained classes are stored. Each
unique constant string has one entry in the string
section. Obfuscation tools that implement SE re-
place the plaintext constant strings stored in the
string section of an app with encrypted or scram-
bled versions and insert special decryption logic in
the program code to decrypt strings just prior to
their use. (Only non-identifier strings are relevant
in the context of SE, as identifiers must be stat-
ically resolvable. Therefore, identifiers are obfus-
cated through renaming.)
The SE detection component of AndrODet re-
trieves all (non-identifier) strings from the string
section of all DEX-files in an APK and extracts
several features from the string material. The fea-
tures are then fed to a machine learning model that
classifies whether or not the app uses SE. The fol-
lowing features are computed by AndrODet from
the strings in the string section:
• Average entropy
• Average wordsize
• Average length
• Average number of ’=’ characters
• Average number of ’-’ characters
• Average number of ’/’ characters
• Average number of ’+’ characters
• Average number of repeated characters
On a side note, we believe that the authors use of
the term average wordsize is misleading since, based
on the published source code of AndrODet, it turns
out that the wordsize does not refer to the average
size of words in strings. Instead, it is the size of the
underlying Python string object used to represent
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strings in their implementation. It is unclear to us
why the authors chose to use this as a feature, since
the size of a string object is not solely determined by
the number of bytes required to represent a string,
but also depends on, for example, the underlying
Python implementation and the memory allocator
used by the OS. Also, the size of a string object is
not guaranteed to be the same for two strings with
the same content, or to be consistent between runs.
AndrODet uses the MOA platform for on-line
learning, in which samples are fed to the on-line
learning system in a streaming fashion. The pre-
quential evaluation mode of MOA was used for
evaluation: When a new sample arrives from the
stream, it is classified by the current model and the
result is recorded. The model is then immediately
updated with the new sample, and the process re-
peats for the next sample. The final accuracy is
computed as the average percentage of correct clas-
sifications. The authors also train a model using
batch learning for comparison. For batch learning,
they use the ATM framework [6] for automatic tun-
ing of model hyperparameters.
3. Empirical Verification of the Problem
We have evaluated both the batch and on-line
learning approaches described by Mirzaei et al., us-
ing the published AndrODet source code1. We used
all of the samples from the AMD dataset, except for
63 samples in which the strings in the string section
could not be decoded. We created the datasets for
training and testing in the following way: First,
100 training and testing sets were constructed by
splitting the AMD dataset using completely ran-
dom sampling. Next, we created another 100 pairs
of training and testing sets, by repeating the above
procedure, with the added constraint that samples
from the same malware family should never appear
in both training and testing data. These two col-
lections of training and testing sets will be referred
to as the random and non-overlapping sets, respec-
tively, for the remainder of this section. The exact
procedure for creating the non-overlapping sets is
outlined in Algorithm 1.
We repeated the experiments for each of the 100
train/test sets of the respective splitting strate-
gies (i.e., we used 100-fold cross validation). Like
1We plan to make the code for running our experiments
available shortly.
Algorithm 1: Procedure for constructing train-
ing and testing sets without overlapping mal-
ware families.
F : set of all families
S: set of all samples
Tr: set of samples in the training set
Te: set of samples in the testing set
s(f): a function returning all the samples
belonging to family f
rand(s): a function returning a random sample
from set s
input : S, F
Tr = ∅
while |Tr| ≤ |S|2 do
f = rand(F )
F = F − f
Tr = Tr ∪ s(f)
end
Te = S − Tr
output: Tr, Te
Mirzaei et al., we used an SVM classifier for batch
learning, and leveraging bagging for on-line learn-
ing. For the batch learning case we ran the ATM
framework to find the best hyperparameters for
each train/test set, using a budget of 200 configu-
ration trials. For the on-line case, we first trained a
model on the training set, and then used the model
to classify the samples in the testing data (without
updating the model). The results for batch and on-
line learning are shown in Figure 1. For the on-line
case, we get a mean accuracy of 80% with the ran-
dom sets, which is similar to the accuracy reported
by Mirzaei et al. For the non-overlapping case, how-
ever, the accuracy drops to only 53% on average
(with a much greater variance across the 100 mod-
els). For the batch learning case, the difference is
even more dramatic. Here, we get an average accu-
racy of 92% for the random case, and 50% for the
non-overlapping case.
One potential concern for us was that the dis-
tribution of samples from different families in the
AMD dataset is highly skewed. For example, about
one third of all samples belong to one family. This
could, potentially, result in some training or testing
sets containing samples from only a handful of fam-
ilies when we use our non-overlapping approach. To
rule out the possibility that this was the cause of
the reduced accuracy in the non-overlapping cases,
we conducted another set of experiments where a
3
M
O
A
ra
n
d
om
M
O
A
n
o
ov
er
la
p
A
T
M
ra
n
d
om
A
T
M
n
o
ov
er
la
p
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
A
cc
u
ra
cy
Figure 1: Box plot of classifier accuracy for the random and
non-overlapping train/test configurations, using the batch
(ATM) and on-line (MOA) machine learning frameworks.
classifier was trained on samples from all families
except one, and the model was evaluated on the left-
out family. We repeated this process for all families
and computed the average accuracy, weighted by
the number of samples in each family. The exper-
iment was performed both for batch (ATM) and
on-line learning (MOA), using the same parame-
ters and setup as described above. Similar to our
first set of experiments, the average accuracy was
48% for batch learning and 54% for on-line learning.
Moreover, the F-score for the respective cases were
0.11 and 0.21. Figure 2 shows the individual clas-
sification accuracy for each family. As can be seen
from the figure, the accuracy varies widely between
different families.
4. Shortcomings of the PraGuard Dataset
for Evaluating AndrODet
The PraGuard dataset was created by obfuscat-
ing all samples from the combined MalGenome and
Contagio malware datasets using the obfuscation
tool DexGuard. Mirzaei et al. used 1495 string-
encrypted samples from PraGuard, along with the
same number of non-obfuscated samples, to eval-
uate their batch-learned model. The reason that
we believe PraGuard to be a poor choice for eval-
uating AndrODet is the particular way in which
DexGuard implements SE. Most obfuscators that
support SE work by substituting a plaintext string
in the string section with an encrypted version.
The encrypted string can therefore still be read-
ily extracted from the string section and analyzed.
However, DexGuard implements a more sophisti-
cated form of SE that stores encrypted strings as
byte arrays, rather than as actual strings in the
string section. Since such byte arrays cannot be
easily told apart from regular arrays used by the
obfuscated app, DexGuard effectively prevents ex-
traction and analysis of encrypted strings. While
DexGuard is closed source, independent analysis
of DexGuard-obfuscated apps has confirmed this
method of applying SE [7]. Because DexGuard pre-
vents AndrODet from extracting strings from the
string section to compute features used for classifi-
cation, we believe PraGuard is a poor choice for
evaluating the generalizability of AndrODet. In
fact, detecting DexGuard-obfuscated apps in which
all (or almost all) constant strings have been re-
moved from the string section is a trivial task
that can be achieved with a simple heuristic, and
does not require an advanced machine learning ap-
proach. We have analyzed the PraGuard dataset
and confirmed that for 90% of the SE samples all
non-identifier strings were removed from the string
section. The vast majority of the remaining samples
had only a small number of non-identifier strings.
We speculate that the relatively good performance
on the PraGuard dataset reported by Mirzaei et al.
is due to some DexGuard-encrypted samples ap-
pearing in the AMD dataset, allowing the classifier
to learn to identify this particular type of SE. (For
example, it would be trivial for a machine learning
system to learn that an average string length of 0 in-
dicates obfuscation.) However, as our experiments
in the preceding section show, AndrODet fails to
accurately detect SE in the general case.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
Our experimental evaluation of the SE detection
capabilities of AndrODet strongly indicates that
the system fails to learn a generalizable model for
detecting SE, and instead bases its decision on the
malware family to which a sample belongs. Since
we obtained similar results with both the on-line
and batch learning approaches proposed by Mirzaei
et al., we believe the main problem to be the fea-
tures used by AndrODet, rather than limitations
of a specific machine learning approach. A poten-
tial explanation for the weak discriminative power
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Figure 2: Individual classification accuracy of each family, when a classifier was trained on all other families in the AMD
dataset.
of the features used to detect SE in AndrODet
is that they are all based on compound statistics
over all strings in an app. Since the percentage
of strings that are actually subjected to encryption
can vary dramatically between SE-obfuscated apps
(i.e., it cannot be assumed that all strings in an
SE-obfuscated app are encrypted) features such as
the average string entropy or length are not very
informative. A more viable approach might be to
detect SE on a per-string basis, and determine, for
example, a threshold on the number of obfuscated
strings for classifying an app as using SE.
Finally, it should be noted that we have only
considered SE detection in this comment paper.
Since we have not evaluated the performance of An-
drODets detection of identifier renaming and con-
trol flow obfuscation, we can neither confirm nor
rule out the possibility of similar problems when
detecting these kinds of obfuscations. However,
the high accuracy Mirzaei et al. report on the
PraGuard datasets when evaluating identifier re-
naming is reassuring, as our concerns regarding the
use of PraGuard apply to SE only, and not to iden-
tifier renaming. Similarly, we are not aware of any
reasons to doubt the validity of the evaluation of
control flow obfuscation detection.
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